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Abstract
Everett’s relative states interpretation of quantum mechanics has
met with problems related to probability, the preferred basis, and mul-
tiplicity. The third theme, I argue, is the most important one. It has
led to developments of the original approach into many-worlds, many-
minds, and decoherence-based approaches. The latter especially have
been advocated in recent years, in an effort to understand multiplicity
without resorting to what is often perceived as extravagant construc-
tions. Drawing from and adding to arguments of others, I show that
proponents of decoherence-based approaches have not yet succeeded
in making their ontology clear.
1 Introduction
Everett’s ‘relative states’ formulation of quantum mechanics was proposed
more than 50 years ago [1, 2], at a time when the Copenhagen interpretation
reigned essentially unchallenged. Everett wanted to (i) retain the universal
validity of the Schro¨dinger equation; (ii) eliminate the need for the collapse
of the wave function; (iii) eliminate the need for an external observer; and
(iv) offer a derivation of the Born rule.
Research on Everett’s approach has, over the years, largely focussed on
the three themes of probability, the preferred basis, and multiplicity. This
paper intends to succinctly assess where this research stands and what are
the most significant open problems. I shall review the above three themes,
emphasizing why I believe the third one is the most important. I will then
comment on different ways of understanding multiplicity, arguing that the
currently most popular one leaves crucial questions unanswered.
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2 Probability and preferred basis
Everett claimed that “the statistical assertions of the usual interpretation
[. . . ] are deducible (in the present sense) from the pure wave mechanics that
starts completely free of statistical postulates” [2]. More recently, the at-
tempt to understand how probability emerges in Everett’s approach has fo-
cussed on decision theory (for a review see [3]). A number of investigators
have attempted to derive the square amplitude measure and Born’s rule from
natural decision-theoretic postulates. Specifically, they try to show that a
‘rational’ agent who believes he or she lives in an Everettian universe will
make decisions as if the square amplitude measure gave chances for outcomes.
The success of this program, however, is controversial [4].
A necessary condition for encountering distinct outcomes in Everett’s
approach is that a product state evolves into an entangled state, i.e.
|φ〉|ψ〉 →
∑
i
ci|φi〉|ψi〉 =
∑
i
c′i|φ
′
i〉|ψ
′
i〉. (1)
Although the representation on the left-hand side is essentially unique, the
one on the right-hand side never is. Yet outcomes are understood as sin-
gling out a specific representation. This is the preferred-basis problem. In
some circumstances decoherence theory may help to identify the appropriate
basis [5].
With respect to multiplicity, Everett’s approach has been interpreted as
involving (i) many worlds, (ii) many minds or, more recently, (iii) decohering
sectors of the wave function. Although the themes of splitting and multi-
plicity are undoubtedly present in Everett’s original paper and thesis, the
ontological basis of the approach is never made entirely explicit in this early
work. There is, however, evidence that later in his life Everett was thinking
in parallel-universes terms [6].
I have advocated elsewhere [7] that in quantum mechanics, the basic
question of interpretation can be formulated as “How can the world be for
quantum mechanics to be true?” This is related to what has been called
the semantic view of theories [8]. There can be many consistent answers
to the question just raised, and each one adds understanding. To achieve
this, however, each answer should be formulated in as precise and as clear a
manner as possible.
Within such a research program, it seems entirely acceptable if the prob-
ability measure is specified as an additional postulate, the way Everett did it
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or in terms of the frequency operator introduced by Hartle [9] and Graham.
Likewise the preferred basis can be associated with beables corresponding to
hidden variables, perhaps motivated by decoherence. There is, however, a
pressing need to understand the true nature of multiplicity.
3 Multiplicity: many worlds and many minds
The idea of a real split into a multitude of worlds was first made explicit by
DeWitt [10].
One of the first questions that come to mind is whether the split oc-
curs every time that, as in (1), a product state transforms into an entangled
state, even if the process is purely microscopic? DeWitt seems to answer
the question in the affirmative. Since microscopic processes can often eas-
ily be reversed, the split itself has to be reversible, or at least reflect that
reversibility.
If the split occurs only in some processes, like Everett himself seems to
have been thinking [1], one should specify the precise conditions (enough
mass, enough particles, . . .) in which it takes place. In other words, one
must add elements to minimal quantum mechanics. Vaidman, for instance,
defines the concept of a world in terms of macroscopic objects, and writes
the quantum state of a world as [11]
|Ψworld〉 = |Ψ〉object
1
|Ψ〉object
2
. . . |Ψ〉objectN |Φ〉. (2)
Since objecti is macroscopic, this immediately raises the question of the
classical-quantum distinction. Further interrogations involve the precise time
when the split occurs, whether it occurs on an equal time hypersurface or on
the light cone, etc.
Instead of splitting in the strict sense, Deutsch [12] postulates a process of
bifurcation. There is at any time an infinite number of worlds, which neither
increases nor decreases. A bifurcation at a given time is associated with a
particular interpretation basis.
If splitting is restricted to specific processes, it can be taken as reversible
or irreversible. An irreversible split will entail differences with unitary quan-
tum mechanics. Indeed in this case, the state in a given world is given by
|φi〉|ψi〉. The reverse measurement interaction would not bring this back to
the initial state (although it would bring
∑
i ci|φi〉|ψi〉 back to the initial
state).
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Such are questions that must be answered for the many-worlds approach
to be well-defined. Answering them is also necessary for the quantum mea-
surement problem to be solved, since the gist of the solution precisely consists
in the splitting of worlds.
The many-minds view [13] places the split in consciousness rather than
in the outside world. There is, in the words of Lockwood [14], “no good
reason for supposing that the apparent macroscopic definiteness of the world
is anything other than an artefact of our own subjective point of view.”
In the many-minds approach, kets |ψi〉 in (1) involve brain states and
these are in a quantum superposition. There can either be one mind (believ-
ing i with probability |ci|
2), or an infinite number of minds, supervening on
brain states.
Similar questions can be raised in the many-minds view as in the many-
worlds view. What kinds of mind split? Only human minds, or also cats’
minds? What, in the quantum mechanical formalism, singles out brain
states? Again these and similar questions must be answered before anyone
can claim to have solved the measurement problem satisfactorily.
4 Decohering wave function
Everett’s way of solving the measurement problem involves asserting that
statements “Observable A has value a1” and “Observable A has value a2”
(with a1 6= a2) are both true. The apparent contradiction is avoided by
construing each statement as “Observable A has value ai relative to value
bi of B,” for i = 1, 2. It has been argued [15, 16] that this solution of
the problem of actuality is analogous to a solution of the problem of tense,
where apparently contradictory statements “Event E1 is now” and “Event E2
is now” are made consistent by construing them as “Event Ei is now relative
to event Fi,” for i = 1, 2.
Formally, this solution of the problem of tense consists in adding a di-
mension to reality. The universe is not fully specified through its spatial,
but only through its spatiotemporal, configuration. And this, in quantum
mechanics, is essentially what many worlds do. The universe (say at a given
time) is not adequately specified by giving a single spatial configuration. It
involves many configurations, differing in macroscopic aspects, which can be
indexed by an additional variable that can be viewed as an added dimension
to reality.
4
The decohering wave function approach to understanding Everett denies
that there is a genuine split into many worlds or many minds. The mul-
tiplicity is instead associated with sectors in the decohering universal wave
function, in each of which sectors observables have values relative to other
ones. To quote Wallace [17], “If A and B are to be ‘live cat’ and ‘dead cat’
then [different micro-world properties] P and Q [on which A and B supervene]
will be described by statements about the state vector which (expressed in a
position basis) will concern the wave function’s amplitude in vastly separated
regions RP and RQ of configuration space, and there will be no contradiction
between these statements.”
Can this attempt to avoid contradiction be understood in terms of added
dimensions? The fact that there is no genuine split means that the added
dimension referred to earlier, as a label for distinct worlds, is not available
here. But then it is not clear why there is no contradiction. Obviously, the
projections in real three-dimensional space of the live cat configuration space
coordinates cannot overlap with the projections of, say, the Geiger counter
coordinates. Why could they overlap with the projections of the dead cat
coordinates? Would mass distributions in one branch behave as ‘ghosts’ to
mass distributions in other branches?
One way to introduce extra dimensions is to use the ones provided by
configuration space. This may be what Wallace and others have in mind. But
the problem just mentioned does not disappear. How are we to make sense
of projections in three-dimensional space, and determine what is allowed to
overlap and what is not? Moreover, there is another problem with adding
in all the dimensions of configuration space. Do we have in mind the full
fine-grained configuration down to the level of subatomic particles? Or do
we rather envisage some coarse-grained configuration? Proponents of the
decohering wave function approach clearly mean the latter. But then one
needs to specify what level of coarse graining is meant.
That need is denied by Wallace [17], who believes that “the somewhat
blurred borderline between states where quasi-particles exist and states where
they do not should not undermine the status of the quasi-particles as real—
any more than the absence of a precise point where a valley stops and a
mountain begins should undermine the status of the mountain as real.” But
the analogy breaks down at a crucial point. Different levels of coarse grain-
ing will never make two similar mountains stem from just one, whereas Ev-
erettian multiplicity is here understood to appear at some level of coarse
graining only.
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To put Everettian multiplicity in perspective, Allori et al. [18] have em-
phasized the importance of the concept of primitive ontology, whose elements
are the stuff that things are made of. Their analysis leads to the conclusion
that they “do not see how the existence and behavior of tables and chairs
and the like could be accounted for without positing a primitive ontology—a
description of matter in space and time.”
Based on that, a specific ontology for the many-worlds theory, close to
Schro¨dinger’s first interpretation of the wave function, was proposed through
a three-dimensional mass density defined in terms of the full configuration-
space wave function as [19]
m(x, t) =
N∑
i=1
mi
∫
dx1 . . . dxNδ(x− xi)|Ψ(x1, . . .xN ; t)|
2
=
N∑
i=1
mi|ψi(x, t)|
2. (3)
It can be shown that the live cat and the dead cat both contribute to the
total mass density in three-dimensional space. In the words of Allori et al.,
however, “the universe according to [this theory] resembles the situation of
a TV set that is not correctly tuned, so that one always sees a mixture of
several channels.” Making sense of this is a challenge that proponents of the
decohering wave function approach have to take up.
5 Conclusion
Everett’s approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics can be un-
derstood in several different ways. Some of the questions and problems left
unanswered in Copenhagen quantum mechanics or in the Dirac and von
Neumann collapse theory also have to be resolved in Everett’s approach.
It nevertheless appears that the more ‘extravagant’ understanding, namely
that of many worlds, is the one whose basic ontology is clearest and which
provides the logically sharpest solution to the measurement problem.
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